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guilty plea and pleaded guilty to one count. under the provision be initiated by a prison-
The allegations of the prior convictions er but rather by the court or the Director 
wefe struck on motiol'l of the People, and of Corrections. (Alanis v. Superior Court, 
the second count was dismissed. Thomas Cal., 83 Cal.Rptr. 355, 463 P.2d 707.) 
was committed to the California Rehabili-
tation Center under the narcotics rehabili-
tation program (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 
3051) but was excluded from that program. 
In April 1967 probation was denied, and he 
was sentenced to prison for the tenn pre-
scribed by law. 
In May 1969 Thomas filed with respon-
dent the petition seeking relief under sec-
tion 1168. The petition alleged "on infor- . 
matian and belief" that "the current diag-
nostic ~tudy -* * *_ recommends his re-
lease under qualified parole or probation 
supervision" and that "because of the Na-
ture of things and his status as an inmate 
of the * * * Department of Correc-
tions, [he] is unable to obtain a copy of 
this current diagnostic study * * * and 
recommendation.1! He requested "the 
Court to investigate the matters presented 
in this Petition * * *, to call for the 
Department of Corrections to present a 
current diagnostic study * * * and 
recommendation, and to recall the ,commit-
ment * * * and re-sentence Defendant 
to probation * * *." Respondent sum-
marily denied the petition on May 28, 1969. 
An attempt to file .a notice of appeal from 
. the denial was rejected by the clerk of re-
spondent court. 
[Is 2] Under the prOVISIOn relied upon 
in Penal Code, section 1168 the court is au-
thorized to recall a prison sentence and 
commitment and to resentence the defend-
ant if such action is deemed warranted by 
the diagnostic study and recommendations 
approved by the Director of Corrections. 
The provision was not intended to author-
ize the granting of probation as an alterna-
tive to release on pa.ro1e but rather to em-
power the court to take such action where 
it appears from the specified matters that 
the prison sentence should never had been 
imposed. (Holder v. Superior. Court, Ca1., 
83 Cal.Rptr. 353, 463 P.2d 705.) The 
Legislature did not intend that a proceeding 
The alternative writ of mandamus is dis-
charged, and the petition for a peremptory 
writ is denied. 
. TRAYNOR, C. J., and McCOMB, PE-
TERS, TO BRINER, MOSK and SULLI-
VAN, JJ., concur. 
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Jan. 27, 1970. 
Rehearing Denied Feb. 25, 1970. 
Action was brought for injunction to 
quiet title to road over which defendant 
claimed easement by prescription.' The Su-
perior Court, Yuba County, Richard A. 
Schoenig, J., rendered judgment adverse 
to plaintiff, and plaintiff appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Traynor, C. J., held that 
evidence sustained finding that defendant 
acquired easement or right-of-way in road 
by prescription. 
Affirmed. 
McComb, J.f dissented. 
I. New Trial <8=>163(1) 
Order directing that prQceedings be re-
opened in cause tried without jury was 
ruling on motion for new trial within 
meaning of both statute dealing with hear-
ing on motion for new trial and statute 
dealing with powers of judge on motion 
for new ~rial in cause tried by court. 
West's Ann.Code Civ.Proc. §§ 660, 662. 
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2. New Trial €=>163(2) 
Failure of trial court, in cause tried 
without jury, to include language directing 
vacation of prior findings and judgment 
in ruling on motion for new trial could not 
lessen effect of ruling. West's Ann.Code 
Civ.Proe. §§ 660, 662. 
3. Judgment €=>397 
Trial €=>66 
In view of statutory provision that 
when case is reopened in lieu of granting 
a new trial, effect is same as if case had 
been reopened before findings had been 
filed or judgment entered, order made pur-
suant thereto directing that case be reopen-
ed has effect of vacating findings and 
judgment. West's Ann.Code Civ.Proc. § 
662. 
4. New Trial €=>159 
Where matter, which was tried with-
out jury, was returned to posture in which 
it was prior to date of judgment under 
statutory provision that when case is re-
opened in lieu of granting new trial, ef-
fect is same as if case had been reopened 
before findings had been filed or judgment 
entered, motion for new trial was disposed 
of, and provisions of statute dealing with 
new trial no longer applied. West's Ann. 
Code Civ.Proc. §§ 660, 662. 
5. Trial €=>72 
Though court trying cause without jury 
lost jurisdiction to act on motion for new 
trial 60 days after motion was filed, its 
jurisdiction to enter judgment in reopened 
proceedings was in no way affected. 
West's Ann.Code Civ.Proc. §§ 660, 662. 
6. Trial €=>404(5) 
Fact that judgment was not in con-
formity with memorandum opinion did not 
affect validity of judgment, since "memo-
randum opinion" is not a decision, and 
though it may purport to decide issues in 
case, it is merely an informal statement of 
views of trial judge, and it does not con-
stitute findings of fact. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
7. Easements ~5 
Elements necessary to establish pre-
scriptive easemen~ are, with exception of 
requirement that taxes be paid, identical 
with those required to prove acquisition 
of title by adverse possession: open and 
notorious use or possession, that is con-
tinuous and uninterrupted, hostile to true 
owner, and under claim of right, and such 
use for five-year statutory period confers 
title by prescription. West's Ann.Code 
Civ.Proe. § 321; West's Ann.Civ.Code, § 
1007. 
8. Easements ~5 
Taxes need not be paid by claimant 
of easement by prescription in apsence of 
showing by record owner that taxes were 
separately levied on easement. West's 
• Ann.Code Civ.Proc. § 321; West's Ann. 
Civ.Code, § 1007. 
9. Easements €=>36(3) 
Evidence sustained finding that de-
fendant had easement in road. West's 
Ann.Code Civ.Proc. § 321; West's Ann.Civ. 
Code, § 1007. 
10. Easements €=>61(12) 
Judgment holding that defendant had 
easement in road was not ambiguous or 
conditional because judgment failed to 
specify whether defendant's right to use 
road was conditioned on his payment of 
his share of maintenance expense and, if so, 
what that share was and to whom it should 
be paid. West's Ann.Civ.Code, § 845. 
Steel & Arostegui and Robert W. Steel, 
Marysville, for plaintiff and appellant. 
Hewitt, McBride, Kenward & Lane and 
James R. McBride, Yuba City, for de-
fendant and respondent. 
TRAYNOR, Chief Justice. 
Plaintiff brought this proceeding for an 
injunction and to quiet her title to a road 
over which defendant claimed both an 
easement .by prescription and a right to 
pass by virtue of an implied dedication to 
the public. On September 19, 1966, the 
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court entered judgment for plaintiff quiet-
ing her title to the road and enjoining any 
occupancy or trespass by defendant. 
The court found that the road had existed 
on plaintiff's property since 1910 or be~ 
fore, that defendant had frequently used 
the road without plaintiff's consent and 
claimed an interest in the road adverse to 
plaintiff's title. The court also found 
that defendant acquired his property ad-
joining plaintiff's in 1964 and that his 
immediate predecessor in title had never 
claimed a right of way over the road, but 
had asked for and received permission to 
use the road whenever he made use of it. 
None of defendant's predecessors in title 
had made use of the road under a claim 
of right or adversely to plaintiff's title suf· 
ficient to establish any legal claim, and 
there had never been a formal or implied 
dedication of the road to public use. 
A hearing on defendant's motion for new 
trial was held on November 10, 1966. 
Thereafter, the court filed a "Ruling on 
Motion for New Trial" ,ordering that the 
matter be reopened for' testimony of de-
fendant's predecessor in title only but not 
of any other witnesses already heard. A 
hearing was held on February 27, 1967. 
On March 14, 1967, the court filed a memo-
randum opinion adopting the previous judg-
ment in its entirety. On April 3, 1967, de-
fendant filed a second notice of intention 
to move for a new trial. On August 4, 
1967, however, the court filed another mem-
orandum opinion modifying the "original 
Opinion" and holding that defendant had a 
right to use the road for purposes related 
to farming operations on his land and that 
defendant must share in the maintenance 
and upkeep of the road. New findings of 
fact and conclusions of law were filed, and 
on October 10, 1967, judgment was entered 
in conformity with the modified opinion. 
Plaintiff appeals from that part of the Oc-
tober 10, 1967 judgment awarding defend-
ant an easement in the road. 
Plaintiff contends that the trial court 
lacked jurisdiction to modify the judgment 
of September 19, 1966 and that, if it had 
463 P .2d-45Va 
jurisdiction, there is no evidence to sup-
port the court's finding that the use of the 
road by defendant and his predecessor in 
title was adverse to her title. She also 
contends that the judgment is ambiguous 
in failing to specify whether the easement 
was conditioned on payment by defendant 
of a part of the maintenance expense, and, 
if so, what that share is, to whom it is to 
be paid, and, in what state of repair the 
road is to be maintained. We have con-
cluded that none of the foregoing conten-
tions has merit and that the judgment 
should be affirmed. 
Jurisdiction to Enter the Judgment of 
October 10, 1967 
The suggestion that the court lacked 
jurisdiction to enter the judgment of Oc-
tober 10, 1%7 is based on Code of Civil 
Proc~dure section 660 governing motions 
for a new trial. At the time this action 
was commenced the relevant part of that 
section read: "Except as otherwise pro-
vided in Section 12a of this code, the 
power of the court to pass on motion for 
a new trial shaH expire 60 days from and 
after service on the moving party of writ-
ten notice of the entry of the judgment, 
or if such notice has not theretofore been 
served, then 60 days after filing of the 
notice of intention to move for a new trial. 
If such motion is not determined within 
said period of 60 days, or within said period 
as thus extended, the effect shall be a 
denial of the motion without further order 
of the court. A motion for a new trial 
is not determined within the meaning of 
this section until an order ruling on the 
motion (1) is entered in the pennanent 
minutes of the court or (2) is signed by 
the judge and filed with the clerk." 
[1] Plaintiff contends that the trial 
court never ruled on defendant's motion 
for a new trial and therefore lacked juris-
diction to make further ord'ers granting 
relief under section 660 subsequent to the 
denial of the motion by operation of law 
60 days from September 19, 1966, the date 
upon which notice of entry of judgment 
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was mailed. This argument denies any ef-
fect to the order of November 10, 1966, 
made within the 60-day period and titled 
by the court "Ruling on Motion for New 
Tria1." That order directing that the pro-
ceedings be reopened was a "ruling on the 
motion" within the meaning of both sec-
tion 660 and section 662 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure. Section 662 governs the 
powers of a court ruling on a motion for 
new trial and provides specifically: "In 
ruling on such motion, in a cause tried 
without a jury, the court may, on such 
terms as may be just, change or add to the 
findings, modify the j-udgment, in whole 
or in part, vacate the judgment, in whole 
or in part, and grant a new trial on all or 
part of the issues, or, in lieu of granting a 
new trial, may vacate and Set aside the 
findings and judgment and reopen the CaSe 
for further proceedings and the introduc-
tion of additional evidence with the same 
effect as if the case had been reopened after 
the submission thereof and before findings 
had been filed or judgment rendered." 
(Italics added.) 
[2-4] Plaintiff concedes that the court 
did reopen the proceedings, but contends 
that it did not vacate the findings and 
judgment pursuant to section 662. The 
failure of the trial court to include language 
directing vacation of its prior findings and 
judgment in the ruling on the motion for 
new trial cannot lessen the effect of that 
ruling. The court ordered that the matter 
be reopened. Section 662 provides that 
when a case is reopened in lieu of granting 
a new trial, the effect is the same as if 
the case had been reopened before the 
findings had been filed or judgment enter-
ed. It follo~s that an order made pursuant 
to section 662 directing that a case be re-
opened has the effect of vacating the find-
I. Plaintiff's claim that the court denied 
the motion for new trial on March 14, 
1967 is not supported by the record. The 
memornndum opinion of that dnte read: 
"On Order of the Court, the above en-
titled matter was set for further hearing 
to determine if any further evidence would 
alter the Opinion heretofore rendered in 
favor of the plaintiff. 
ings and judgment. Inasmuch as the mat-
ter was returned to the posture in which 
it was prior to entry of judgment, the mo-
tion for new trial had been disposed of and 
the provisions of section 660 no longer ap-
plied.1 
[5,6] Defendant filed his second no-
tice of intention to move for a new trial on 
April 3, 1967, prior to entry of judgment. 
The motion was denied by operation of 
law on June 2, 1967, when the court failed 
to act on the motion. Although the court 
lost jurisdiction to act on that motion 60 
days after the motion was filed, its juris-
diction to enter judgment in the reopened 
proceedings was in no way affected. The 
fact that the judgment was not in con-
formity with the memorandum opinion of 
March 14, 1967 does not affect the validity 
of the judgment. A memorandum opinion 
is not a decision. Although it may purport 
to decide issues in the case, it is merely 
an informal statement of the views of the 
trial judge. It does not constitute findings 
of fact. (People v. Hills (1947) 30 Cal.2d 
694, 702, 185 P 2d 11; De Cou v. Howell 
(1923) 190 Cal. 741, 751, 214 P.2d 444. 
See, 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, p. 1873.) 
"'No antecedent expression of the judge, 
whether casual or cast in the form of an 
opinion, can in any way restrict his absolute 
power to declare his final conclusion * * 
by filing the "decision" (findings of fact 
and conclusions of law) provided for by 
* * * the Code of Civil Procedure.' 
(Scholle v. Finnell, 173 Cal. 372, 376, 159 
P. 1179.)" (Strudthoff v. Yates (1946) 28 
Cal.2d 602, 616, 170 P.2d 873, 881.) 
Sufficiency of the Evidence of An Ease-
ment by Prescription 
The findings of fact and conclusions of 
law accompanying the judgment of October 
"The Court is satisfied that further evi-
dence indicates that the previous ruling 
of the Court in this matter should not be 
disturbed. 
"Counsel for plaintiff shall prepare the 
necessary documents." 
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10, 1%7 recited that the plaintiff was the property. The fence along the south side 
owner in fee simple of the road in issue, was removed sometime after Matt Thome 
that defendant was the owner in fee siPlple purchased the land later cqnveyed to de-
of real property adjoining the road, and fendant. 
that: "It is true that defendant, without 
plaintiff's consent or permission frequent-
ly enters upon .said roadway and uses the 
same for the purposes of conducting his 
farming operations, that is to say, for the 
purposes of cultivation and harvesting the 
crops produced on said real property * * 
[D]efendant's predecessor in title * * * 
M. Thome * * * used said road for the 
purpose of cultivating his said property and 
harvesting the crops thereon for more than 
ten years prior to the commencement of 
this action, which said use had been con-
ducted openly, notoriously, continuously and 
adverse to plaintiff's alleged rights in said 
roadway, and without asking or receiving 
permission from anyone, that is to say, 
either the plaintiff herein, or plaintiff's 
predecessors in interest." 
The following evidence relative to the 
use of the road by defendant and his 
predecessor in title, Matt Thome, was ad-
duced at the trial. Plaintiff is the owner 
of farm property on the Oroville Highway 
in Yuba County. She purchased the prop-
erty in 1943. She and her late husband had 
first leased the property in 1937. Defend-
ant purchased the farm propert,y immediate-
ly south of that owned by plaintiff in 1964 
from Matt Thome who had owned it since 
1946. At the time Thome acquired his 
property a road existed on plaintiff's prop-
erty_ The road ran in a westerly direction 
from the highway along the southern 
boundary of plaintiff's property. The road 
had at one time been fenced on each side, 
but the fence along the north side was no 
longer there when plaintiff purchased her 
2. The letter reads: "Dear Mrs. Taormino: 
"You have told -me that you are plan· 
ning possible improvements to the road 
which runs westerly from the Oroville 
Highway along the southerly border of 
your ranch, and immediately to the north 
of my property. You have also told me 
that. in connection with a cost sharing 
scheme that is being worked out for the 
road, your attorney has said that it would 
The road was used by both strangers and 
local residents to reach farms to the west 
of plaintiffs property and by occasional 
hunters and fishermen to gain access to the 
bottomlands of the Feather River. At 
times the road had been posted at the Oro-
ville Highway entrance. ' Plaintiff and her 
son-in-law, Roger Hoon, stopped strangers 
using the road to ascertain whether they 
had legitimate· business, but did not stop 
neighbors. 
Plaintiff and Hoon testified that they 
had posted "No Trespassing" signs twice, 
that Thome had requested permission to use 
the road at harvest time and on numerous 
other occasions, and that permission had 
been granted. In June 1965, Hoon present-
ed a letter drafted by plaintiff's attorney to 
Thome for signature. The letter, signed 
by Thome, acknowledged that Thome had 
no claim to a right of way over the road, 
had never made such a claim and had not 
represented to defendant that defendant 
would have such a claim.! Thome testified 
that he had no permission to use the road 
and had never spoken to plaintiff about the 
use of the road. He used the road fre-
quently for at least 10 years without asking 
permission of anyone, knowing it was on 
plaintiff's property. The road was closed 
only when repairs were being made. He 
had signed. the letter believing its purport 
to be that he had not given defendant any 
right to the road. He had never seen sign's-
posted by others limiting the use of the 
road, although he had posted one himself 
at one time. 
be helpful to you if I acknowledged that 
I do not have and that I have never 
made a claim to a right of way over 
that road. This I am happy to do. 
"When I sold a portion of my property 
to Mr. Denney about a year ago, I af· 
forded Mr. Denney other aecess to the 
property I sold him, and I at no time 
represented to him that he would have 
any right of way over your road." 
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Defendant testified that he and other 
users of the road paid to have it oiled and 
sanded in 1964. He refused to make an 
additional contribution later in that year 
when requested to do so by plaintiff and, in 
response to her threat to put a chain aCross 
the road, asserted his claim to a right of 
way. 
Other defense witnesses offered cumula-
tive testimony that they had often used the 
road without permission and had not seen 
"No Trespassing" signs. 
[7,8] If substantial evidence supports 
the judgment that defendant acquired an 
easement or right of way in the roadway by 
prescription; the judgment must be affirm-
ed. All conflicts must be resolved in favor 
of the prevailing party and the evidence 
viewed in the light most favorable to him. 
(O'Banion v. Borba (1948) 32 Cal.2d 145, 
147-148, 195 P 2d 10.) The elements nec-
essary to establish a prescriptive easement 
are. with the exception of the requirement 
that taxes be paid.3 identical with those 
required to prove acquisition of title by 
adverse possession: open and notorious 
use or possess-ion that is continuous -and 
uninterrupted, hostile to the true owner. 
and under ,a, claim of -right. (Thomas v. 
England· (1886) 71 Cal. 456, 459-460, 12 
P. 491.) Such use for the five-year statu-
tory period of Code of Civil Procedure 
section 321 ' confers a title by prescription. 
(Civ.Code,§ 1007.)" 
[9] Plaintiff contends that none of the 
requisite elements of adverse possession 
exist. The foregoing summary of the 
3. Taxes Jieed not be paid by the claimant 
of an easement by prescription in the 
absence of a showing by the record owner 
thnt taxes were separately levied on the 
easement. (Glatts v. Henson (1948) 31 
Ca1.2d 368, 372, ]88 P.2d 745.) 
4. Colle of Civil Procedure section 321: 
"In every action for the recovery of real 
property, or the possession thereof, the 
person estublishing a legal title to the 
property is presumed to have been pos-
sessed thereof within the time required by 
law, and the occupation of the property 
by any other person is deemed to have 
evidence, however, leads us to conclude 
that substantial evidence supports the 
judgme'tlt of the trial court as to each- ele-
ment. Direct evidence established both the 
requisite open, continuous use and the 
nature of the use for purposes related to 
cultivation and harvesting crops on defend-
ant's property. Whether the use was under 
a claim of right adverse to the owner is a 
question of fact. (O'Banion v. Borba, 
supra, 32 Cal.2d 145, 149, 195 P.2d 10.) 
The trial court was not compelled to ac-
cept either plaintiff's evidence or Thome's 
conclusion as expressed in his letter as to 
the nature of the use. (Blank v. Coffin 
(1942) 20 Cal.2d 457, 461, 126 P.2d 868.) 
Thome's testimony and letter were sus-
ceptible of conflicting inferences-that the 
use was permissive and a matter of neigh-
borly accommodation, or tha!' his use of the 
road over a IO-year period without asking 
penmSSlOn adequately demonstrated a 
claim of right to do so. The trial court is 
the arbiter of the facts, and this court 
cannot upset its decision as a matter of 
law when substantial evidence supports 
the judgment. 
Ambiguity of the Judgment 
[10] Plaintiff complains that the judg-
ment fails to specify whether defendant's 
right to use the road is conditioned on his 
payment of his share of the maintenance 
expense and, if so, what that share is and 
to whom it should be paid. The rules 
set forth in section 845 of the Civil Code 
govern the maintenance of private rights 
of way in the absence of 'an agreement.8 
been under nnd in subordination to the 
legal title, unless it appear that the prop-
erty has been held and possessed adverse-
ly to such legal title for five years before 
the commencement of the action." 
5. Civil Code section 1007: "Occupancy 
for the period prescribed by the Code of 
Civil Procedure as sufficient to bar any 
action for the recovery of the property 
confers a title thereto, denominated a title 
by prescription * .. "." 
6. Civil Code section 845: ''The owner of 
any easement in the nature of a private 
right 'of way, or of any land to which any 
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The judgment is in no way conditional. herent power to grant a ,new trial. . (bia~ 
Section 845 provides a method by which mond v. Superior Court (1922) 189 'cai. 
to apportion costs if no agreement is 732, 736, 210 P. 36.) Review of the code 
reached among the owners of an easement sections and their legislative history indi-
and a remedy enforceable against a delin- cates a continuing con~ern on the part of 
quent owner by the other owners of the the Legislature that ,a timely and ef-
easement. ficacious procedure be ,established to avoid 
The judgment is affirmed. the expense and delays of an appeal by al-
lowing the trial court to re-examine the 
PETERS, TOBRINER, MOSK, facts (§ 662) or issues of law (Carney v. 
BURKE and SULLIVAN,]}.; concur. 
McCOMB, Justice (dissenting). 
I dissent on the jurisdictional issue. 
The judgment of October 10, 1967, was 
made after the court had lost control of 
the cause and was therefore in excess 
of jurisdiction and void. The record in-
dicates that the motion for new trial was 
timely made and that the trial court did 
make a fuling on the matioH within the 
statutory time limits. The question pre-
sented is whether this ruling was a suf-
ficient exercise of jurisdiction to comply 
with the statutory grant of power to mod-
ify a judgment without a retrial. In my 
opinion it was not. 
Code of Civil Procedure sections 655 et 
seq. set forth the time and manner in 
which the court may act upon motions for 
new t~ial. These provisions are j uris-
dictional and must be strictly observed. 
(Siegal 'v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal. 
2d 97, 100, 65 Cal.Rptr. 311, 436 P.2d 311; 
Fomco, Inc. v. Joe Maggio, :tnc. '(1961) 
55 Ca1.2d 162, 166, 10 Cal.Rptr. 462, 358 
P.2d 918.) The trial court has no in-
such easement is attached, shall maintain 
it in repair. " 
"If the easement is owned by more than 
one person, or is attached to' parcels' of 
land under different ownership, the cost 
of maintaining it in repair shall be shared 
by each owner of the easement or the 
owners of the parcels of land. as the case 
may be, pursuant to the terms of any 
agreement entered into by the par1;ies 
for that purpose. In the absence of an 
agreement, the cost shall be shared pro-
portionately to the use made of the ease-
ment by each owner. 
"In the absence of an agreemeJ;lt, any 
owner of the easemtmt, or any owner of 
Simmonds (1957) 49 Cal.2d 84, 90, 315 
P.2d 305) after a trial and decision. It 
was originally empowered to do this by 
granting a new trial. Subsequently it was 
given broad powers to, do this by denying 
a new trial. In either case it was required 
to act within a limited, period of time. 
Originally it was required that a motion 
for new trial be made within four judiM 
cial days after judgment was' rendered 
and that the court "d~cide 'summarily on 
such application" (Stats.1851, First SesM 
sian, Ch. XX, §§ 252, 257). The time for 
filing has been changed from time:' to time 
(30 days, Code Civ.Proc., § 659, enacted 
1872), 15 days (§ 659, 1967 am.). It was 
limited to 10 days (1951 am.) at the times 
here involved. There have been legislative 
changes made in the"time within which the 
court must act. (See" Historical Note, 
West's Anno. Code, Code Civ.Proc., § 660~) 
In 1915 hearing and dis~osition -of tbe -moM 
tion for new trial was given precedence over 
all other matters except tTimimll cases, pro-
bate matters and cases actually on trial. 
In 1929 the time withih which the court 
could act' on the . motion was -fixed at 60 
! 
I 
land to which _the easement is attached, 
m~y apply to the 8u~rior court where 
the right of way is lckated for the ap-
pojntment of an imparl-tial arbitrator to 
apportion such cost. If the arbitration 
a~ard is not accepted ~y all of' the own-
ers, the court may determine the propor-
tionate liability of" thej ,owners, and its 
order shall have the flffect of a judgment. 
"If anyone of the owners of the ease-
ment or parce]s of land fails, after de-
mand in writing, to pay his proportion of 
the. expense, action -may, be ,brought 
against him in a court of competent jur-
isdiction by the other owners, either 
jointly or severally, for contribution." 
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days from and after service on the moving 
party of written notice of entry of judg-
ment or, if such notice was not served, 
then 60 days after filing the notice of in-
tention to move for new trial. Fallowing 
a study by the California Law Revision 
Commission that disclosed variance and 
confusion as to what acts must be done 
by a judge to make an effective ruling 
within the 60 days in which he has juris-
diction to act on the motion, section 660 
was amended in 1959 to provide that "A 
motion for a new trial is not determined 
within the meaning of this section until 
an order ruling on the motion (1) is en-
tered in the permanent minutes of the court 
or (2) is signed by the judge and filed 
with the clerk. The entry of a new trial 
order in the permanent minutes of the 
court shall constitute a determination of the 
motion even though such minute order as 
entered expressly directs that a written or-
der be prepared, signed and filed. The min-
ute entry shall in all cases show the date on 
which the order actually is entered in the 
permanent minutes, but failure to comnly 
with this direction shall not impair the 
validity or effectiveness of this order." 
(§ 660; Siegal v. ~uperior Court (1968) 
68 Cal.2d 97, 100-101, 65 Cal.Rptr. 311, 436 
P.2d 311; McCordic v. Crawford (1943) 23 
Cal.2d I, 6, 142 P.2d 7; 34 State Bar J., 
643.) Obviously this language required 
that a subsequent order be correlative to 
and not different from the determination 
of the court as entered in a timely minute 
order. There is nothing which indicates 
that the court could extend beyond 60 
days the time within which it could "pass 
upon," "rule upon" or make a determination 
of the motion for new trial. 
In 1929 an innovation was made by the 
Legislature when it enacted section 662, 
allowing the trial court to make changes 
in the findings or conclusions of law and 
to give an entirely different judgment 
without granting a new trial. This section 
reads: "In ruling on such motion, in a 
cause tried without a jury, the court may, 
on such terms as may be just, change or 
add to the findings, modify the judgment, 
in whole or in part, vacate the judgment, 
in whole or in part, and grant a new trial 
on all or part of the issues, or, in lieu 
of granting a new trial, may vacate and 
set aside the findings and judgment and 
reopen the case for further proceedings 
and the introduction 'of additional evi-
dence with the same effect as if the case 
had been reopened after the submission 
thereof and before findings had been filed 
or judgment rendered. Any judgment 
thereafter entered shall be subject to the 
provisions of section 657 and 659 [motions 
for new trial] of this code." The obvious 
purpose in giving these broad alternative 
powers to the court was to subserve the 
ends of justice and to prevent unnecessary 
delays in cases where the court deemed 
itself mistaken as to its previous view of 
the evidence or in the application thereto 
of the law, without the necessity of grant-
ing a new trial. (Spier v. Lang (1935) 
4 Cal.2d 711, 714, 53 P.2d 138; see 3 Wit-
kin, Cal. Procedure (1954) § 35, p. 2083, 
1967 Supp., p. 852.) In Spier we stated 
at page 715, 53 P.2d at 140: "The lang-
uage of section 660 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure indicates that so long as the court 
'passes' on the motion within the sixty-day 
period, it has lawfully exercised its jurisdic-
tion to determine the motion, and the filing 
of the formal order or findings and judg-
ment 'thereafter,' when the time of filing is 
subsequent to the last day of the sixty-day 
period, does not amount to a denial of 
the motion by operation of law." There 
is no intent indicated in the language of 
the statute that different provisions may 
be incorporated in the formal order or 
findings and judgment entered after the 
6O .. day period had elapsed. An order or 
judgment (i. e., findings) may be signed 
and filed thereafter (De Arman v. Con-
nelly (1933) 134 Cal.App. 173, 180, 25 
P.2d 24) but if different than and not 
made pursuant to an order entered with-
in the 60-day period they are in excess 
of the court's jurisdiction and void. (See 
Avery v. Associated Seed Growers (1963) 
211 Cal.App.2d 613, 628-ti29, 27 Cal.Rptr. 
625.) 
TAORMINO v. DENNY Cal. 719 
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In ruling on the motion for new trial lows: The matter will be reopened to take 
the court may do anyone or more of the the testimony ofMa\ Thome but the Court 
things permitted by section 662 (Oliver v. does not desire :to l\ave any of the other 
Boxley (1960) 181 CaI.App.2d 471, 477, witnesses recalled. If either counsel has 
5 CaJ.Rptr. 468). It is preferable that the newly discovered evidence, they may so 
statutory, language be used in the order introduce it at the time of hearing to take 
ruling on the motion but some departure additional evidence. All other matters will 
in terminology is permissible if the court's be kept in abeyance pending the submission 
: intention is clear (Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack of the causes under the procedure herein-
Plumbing Co. (1961) 55 CaJ.2d 573, 578, above outlined. * * *.. Hearing was 
12 Ca1.Rptr. 257, 360 P.2d 897) or if am- held in February 1%7 after the 60 days 
biguities therein may be reconciled by con- had expired. In March the court entered 
struction to determine the substance and an order stating "The Court is satisfied 
legal effect of the order. (See discussion that further evidence indicates that the 
of cases in 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (1954) previous ruling of the Court in this matter 
§ 37, pp. 2085-2086.) The order should be should not be disturb~d. Counsel for plain-
in the present tense, and is subject to tiff shall prepare the necessary docu-
criticism and possible invalidity if it is in ments." The next order entered was on 
the future tense (Pacific. Home Co. v. August 4, changing the court's decision, 
County of Los Angeles (1953) 41 Ca1.2d and pursuant thereto amended findings 
855, 857, 264 P.2d 539). Whatever number and conclusions were filed on October 10, 
of ,hearings may be held on the motion, a 1967, more than a year after the original 
determinative order ruling thereon should judgment of September 19, 1966. 
be made within the 60-day mandatory pe- The order of November 10, 1%6, was 
riod. entered within the 6O-day period. It pur-
The record herein indicates that at the ported to exercise some of the alternative 
. trial the court pennitted plaintiff, over powers granted by section 662. It did not 
defendant's objections, to introduce in evi- purport to grant a new trial. Had the 
dence a letter from Matt Thome, defend- court granted a new trial, either full or 
ant's predecessor in title, that was highly limited, it would have then" exhausted its 
prejudicial to defendant's case. Neither jurisdiction to rule further on the nIotion, 
party had called Thome as a witness. No and any further trial proceedings would 
continuance was requested so that he could not be subject to the time limitations of 
be called. Judgment was rendered on these sections. The I'in lieu 'of granting 
September 19, 1966. Motion for new a new trial" provisions are, as they state, 
trial urged, among other grounds, errors "in lieu" thereof, and do not constitute 
in law, occurring at the trial and excepted granting a new trial. They empower the 
to by the moving party. On November 10, court "to do certain things in denying the 
1966, the court ruled on this motion. Its motion. Without taking any new evidence 
order recited the grounds of the motion the court may vacate or add to any of the 
u * * * and (3) that errors in law oc- findings. It may re-open for further pro-
curring during the trial and more specifi- ceedings and additional evidence "with 
cally the introduction of a letter by the the same effect as if the case had been re-
witness Thome. * * * This Court does opened after the submission thereof and 
concede that it was influenced to some. before findings had been filed or judgment 
degree by the evidence introduced from rendered." There is no' express extension 
the witness Thome. The Court further of time within which the court may act 
feels that * * * it may well be that after it re-opens. As hereinabove discuss-
Mr. Thome's evidence shculd have been ed, section 660 requires a definitive, not 
given in person and subject to cross-exam- an interlocutory or non-determinative 
ination. Therefore, the Court rules as fo1- order, to be entered within the 6O-day 
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period. Interpreting section 662 to allow 
a trial court to enter an order vacating 
and reopening pursuant to these Hin lieu" 
provisions, with unlimited time thereafter 
to continue further hearings and to make 
further determinations, is contrary to the 
clear intent of these sections. The con-
cluding sentence of section 662 that "Any 
judgment thereafter entered shaH be sub-
ject to the provisions of sections 657 and 
659 of this code" specifically allows ap-
parently unlimited motions for new trial 
to be made as to any judgment or definitive 
order made within the 60 days, subject of 
courSe to the requirement that if the actual 
findings are signed and filed after the 
60-day period the motion is premature if 
taken before such time. (Auto Equity 
Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 
Ca1.2d 450, 459, 20 Ca1.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 
937; 3 Witkin, supra, ·2072.) 
The "in lieu" provisions empower the 
court to vacate and set aside the findings 
and reopen the proceedings, with the effect 
"as if the case had been reopened after the 
submission thereof and before findings 
had been filed or judgment rendered." If 
the further proceedings are required to 
be concluded within the 60-day period, 
and no final determination is made within 
that· time, it would follow that any inter-
mediate orders made pursuant to a motion 
for new trial purporting to set aside any 
portion of the findings or conclusions 
would be ineffective, and that the court's 
jurisdiction to act thereafter would termi-
nate by operation of law. There was 
nothing in the record nor in the order of 
November 10, 1966, which indicated that 
extensive hearings were contemplated or 
that the court thought that the indicated 
error of law was sufficient to support the 
granting of an entirely new trial. It did 
not expressly vacate and set aside the 
findings. It could be implied that it was 
postponing that step until it determined, 
after the introduction of further evidence 
(i. e., the testimony of Thome), whether 
any change should be made in its findings. 
In aid of this interpretation, the language 
of the March 14, 1967, memo opinion is 
enlightening. It reads 'IOn Order of the 
Court, the above entitled matter was set 
for further hearing to determine if any 
further evidence would alter the opinion 
heretofore rendered in favor of the plain-
tiff. The Court is satisfied that further 
evidence indicates that the previous ruling 
of the Court in this matter should not be 
disturbed. * * * " Had this opinion 
been entered as a minute order prior to 
the expiration of the 6O-day period (see 3 
Witkin, supra, p. 1873) it might have 
been a sufficient determination to support 
the original judgment. If the original 
findings are construed to have been ipso 
facto vacated by the order of November 
10, 1966, it might have supported the re-
signing and filing of the same findings 
at a time subsequent to the 60-day period. 
However the jurisdiction of the court to 
proceed had expired be fore March 14, 
1967, and the court's power to act on the 
motion for new trial had expired by 
operation of law. 
The second motion made by defendant, 
dated April 3, 1967, was entitled "Notice 
of Intention to Move for New Trial Lim-
ited to Purpose of Taking Additional 
Testimony and Adding to Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law Pursuant 
to Code of Civil Procedure, Section 662." 
As a motion for new trial it was prema-
ture, and ineffective for any purpose, 
having been filed more than 60 days from 
the entry of the original judgment and no 
judgment was thereafter rendered to which 
it could apply. The majority opinion is 
in error in stating that the motion was 
denied by operation of law on J nne 2, 
1967, when the court failed to act on the 
motion (Opinion, page 362). The motion 
was premature if intended to apply to the 
order of the court of March 14, 1967. Con-
ceding arguendo that that order was made 
at a time when the court retained juris-
diction to act, the necessary documents 
ordered by the court (i. e., findings and 
conclusions) had not been signed or filed. 
The court therefore did not "lose" juris-
diction to act on the motion; it never 
gained jurisdiction. 
PRICE v. SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY Cal. 721 
Cite as 463 P .2d 721 
The points and authorities filed in sup~ tween persons known by him to have been 
port of the second motion, and the court's present at scene of crime in which it was 
subsequent order of August 4, 1967, pur- stated that accused had shot at police 
porting to rule on the motion, indicate that vehicle at that time and place, there was a 
this second motion was considered by the possibility that informer himself was 
court as a Hmotion to take additional testi- present at scene of crime and thus was a 
many after the court had previously ruled material witness on issue of guilt; hence 
that the initial evidence had not justified accused was entitled to have identity of 
a finding that the road in question was informer disclosed. 
dedicated to the public." This indicates Writs granted. 
that the court considered that the matter 
was still before the court after submission 
and before findings were filed, and con-
sidered that the matter was still subject to 
motions to reopen although not to motions 
for new trial. In my opinion the court had 
lost jurisdiction at the end of the original 
60 days. 
For the reasons hereinabove expressed 
I would reverse the 1%7 judgment ap-
pealed from. 
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Trunnel PRICE, Petitioner, 
Y. 
The SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO 
COUNTY, Respondentj 
The PEOPLE, Real Party In Interest. 
L. A. 29680. 
Supreme Court of California, 
In Bank. 
Jan. 30, 1970. 
.Rehearing Denied Feb. 25, 1970. 
Accused sought writs of prohibition 
and mandamus to restrain the Superior 
Court from using against him certain evi-
dence obtained in execution of ,a search 
warrant and to compel the court to order 
disclosure of identity of a confidential in-
former. The Supreme Court, Peters, J., 
held that in view of informer's statement 
that he had overheard a conversation be-
463 P.2d-46 
Burke and McComb, JJ., dissented. 
Mosk, J., dissented in part. 
I. Criminal Law €=>394.4(6) 
Searches and Seizures ~3.6(1) 
Search affidavit reciting that a reliable 
informant had told affiant that he jIhad 
personal knowledge" that accused had in 
his possession a rifle with a scope on it 
two days before shooting, that informant 
had stated that he had overheard a con-
versation between persons "known by him" 
to have been present at scene of c:rime in 
which it was stated that accused had shot 
at police vehicle at that' time and place, 
and that accused was within one block of 
scene of shooting one-half hour after com-
mission of crime was insufficient to justify 
issuance of warrant, and evidence seized in 
execution of warrant must be suppressed. 
2. Witnesses $=3216 
When it appears from evidence that 
an informer is a material witness on issue 
of accused's guilt, the People must either 
disclose the informer's identity or incur 
a, dismissal. 
3. Witnesses ¢::3216 
The defendant need not prove that 
the informer would give testimony favor-
able to the defense in order to compel dis-
closure of his identity, nor need he prove 
that the informer was a participant in or 
even an eyewitness to the crime; the de-
fendant's burden extends only to a show-
ing that in view of the evidence, the in-
former would be a material witness on 
issue of guilt and nondisclosure of his 
identity would deprive the defendant of a 
fair trial. 
